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Suboptimal Executive Privilege 
Stephen C. N. Lilley 
ABSTRACT 
Executive privilege disputes between the political branches shape the 
boundaries of presidential secrecy and congressional authority. Those 
disputes often give rise to calls for political rather than judicial 
resolution. The existing academic literature and judicial doctrine in 
this area offer limited theoretical accounts of when courts should 
abstain from or resolve the executive privilege disputes presented to them 
by the political branches. This Article provides an analytical framework 
for evaluating the outcomes provided by judicial and political 
resolution of executive privilege disputes and then explores how those 
evaluations inform judicial decisions to abstain from or resolve 
executive privilege disputes. Political resolution of these disputes 
produces constitutionally acceptable, but suboptimal, outcomes. Courts 
can provide preferable outcomes in some cases, but judicial involvement 
in executive privilege disputes between the political branches also can 
threaten the legitimacy of courts. This raises the constitutional stakes of 
executive privilege disputes and argues for abstention in many cases. 
Courts conceivably could address those legitimacy concerns by sitting as 
courts of constitutional equity or doctrinalizing their discretion to 
entertain executive privilege disputes between the political branches. 
Such changes appear unwise and unlikely. Courts can change their 
doctrine at the margins to encourage more productive negotiations 
between the political branches and thus improve upon suboptimal 
outcomes. However, a default judicial abstention from executive 
privilege disputes between the political branches, governed by a 
nondoctrinalized prudential discretion, appears appropriate and likely 
to endure. 
 
 
 
  J.D., Yale Law School, 2006. My sincere thanks to David Cohen, Louis Fisher, Sam 
Goodstein, Heidi Kitrosser, Jaynie Lilley, David Pozen, and Gerard Sinzdak for their 
comments and suggestions. This Article reflects my views, and not those of any other 
individual or institution.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Few separation of powers issues have been as consistently 
contentious over the last fifty years as the existence, scope, and 
proper use of executive privilege: the power of a President to 
withhold certain types of information, even from Congress. The 
debate between the need for secrecy and candor within the executive 
branch and the need for congressional oversight has simmered—and 
occasionally raged—since the beginning of the republic, even if not 
framed in terms of “executive privilege.”1 Most commentators now 
 
 1. “The term executive privilege originated in the Eisenhower administration . . . .” 
MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND 
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recognize Congress’s power to oversee the executive branch and the 
President’s power to withhold information when doing so is in the 
public interest. Yet the extent of these implied constitutional powers 
and which of the two must yield during a dispute over a 
congressional demand for information remain hotly debated.2 
The administration of President George W. Bush closed, for 
example, with an ongoing executive privilege dispute. Critics 
contended that political operatives in the White House had 
engineered the removal of competent United States Attorneys 
because they had failed to advance Republican interests or had 
offended local Republican politicians.3 Both the Senate and House 
Judiciary Committees investigated the firings, and the Attorney 
General ultimately resigned.4 The investigations in the House of 
Representatives went all the way to federal court after the 
Department of Justice declined to prosecute the contempt citations 
issued by the House Judiciary Committee.5 
The United States Attorneys investigation featured characteristics 
common to many executive privilege disputes: congressional 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY 39 (2d ed. 2002). Even without that moniker, President George 
Washington and Congress disputed information disclosure. See LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS 
OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 10–11 (2004).  
 2. This Article focuses on executive privilege disputes between Congress and the 
executive branch (i.e., the President and proxies). The models it offers, see infra Parts III and 
IV, do not address disputes between the executive branch and an investigative official, or 
between the executive branch and a private party. 
 3. See Editorial, A Scandal that Keeps Growing, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2007, § 4, at 13. 
The Office of the Inspector General and the Office of Professional Responsibility have issued a 
report criticizing these firings. See U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General 
and Office of Professional Responsibility, An Investigation into the Removal of Nine U.S. 
Attorneys in 2006 (Sep. 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0809a/ 
final.pdf. 
 4. See, e.g., Philip Shenon & David Johnston, A Defender of Bush Power, Gonzales 
Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2007, at A1. 
 5. See generally Complaint, Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives v. 
Miers, No. 08-cv-0409 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2008). The Committee won the first round in 
District Court, see Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 
2d 53, 105–06 (D.D.C. 2008) (rejecting claim that presidential aide has absolute immunity 
from testimony and requiring her to appear before the House Judiciary Committee to assert 
executive privilege), but the Court of Appeals deferred consideration of the case until the next 
Congress, see Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives v. Miers, 542 F.3d 909, 910 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), placing the Committee’s litigation in peril of becoming moot. 
This was avoided by an agreement, facilitated by the Obama Administration, between the 
House Judiciary Committee and the Bush Administration. Carrie Johnson, House Panel 
Interviews Karl Rove About Attorney Firings, WASH. POST, July 8, 2009. 
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committees, split along party lines, investigating perceived 
misconduct in the executive branch;6 an administration defending 
itself from charges of wrongdoing, accusing Congress of undertaking 
a political witch-hunt, and asserting its need to avoid information 
disclosure that would chill advice-giving in the White House;7 a 
series of offers for partial disclosure, counteroffers, and escalating 
political threats;8 an awkward litigation posture when the dispute 
reached the courts;9 and finally a compromise.10 The investigation 
also shared another common feature of executive privilege disputes: 
calls for political, rather than judicial, resolution of the disputes.11 
Great attention has been paid to the substantive merit of 
individual assertions of executive privilege. In contrast, preferences 
for either political or judicial resolution of executive privilege 
disputes have only begun to receive critical scrutiny. The preference 
for political resolution has been criticized,12 but no theory has 
emerged to explain the tradeoffs between political and judicial 
resolution, or to identify factors that courts should consider in 
deciding whether to wade into an executive privilege dispute 
between the political branches. This Article undertakes that analysis. 
It explains that executive privilege disputes likely will end with 
suboptimal outcomes. It offers schematic models to build an 
analytical framework for evaluating whether courts or the political 
process will provide a constitutionally preferable outcome in an 
executive privilege dispute. It does not attempt to identify the best 
 
 6. See, e.g., Gail Russell Chaddock, Bid to Punish Bush Aides May Fail, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, July 27, 2007, at 3 (describing party-line House Judiciary Committee vote to cite 
presidential aides with criminal contempt). 
 7. See, e.g., Peter Wallsten & Richard B. Schmitt, Democrats Content to Let Gonzales 
Twist in the Wind, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at A8 (recounting Vice President Cheney’s 
description of congressional investigations as “a bit of a witch hunt on Capitol Hill, as they 
keep rolling over rocks hoping they will find something”). 
 8. See, e.g., Paul Kane, Senate Panel Approves Subpoenas for 3 Top Bush Aides, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 23, 2007, at A4 (describing rejection of the Bush administration’s offers to testify 
behind closed doors without a transcript and not under oath). 
 9. See supra note 5. 
 10. See Agreement Concerning Accommodation, House of Representatives v. Miers, 
No. 08-cv-0409, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/ 
Agreement090304.pdf. 
 11. See, e.g., Del Q. Wilber, Judge Urged to Order Associates of President to Honor 
Subpoena, WASH. POST, June 24, 2008, at A15 (describing call of Deputy Associate Attorney 
General for Congress to rely on political weapons and compromise to resolve the dispute). 
 12. See David O’Neil, The Political Safeguards of Executive Privilege, 60 VAND. L. REV. 
1079, 1083–87 (2007). 
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method for resolving every executive privilege dispute, but rather 
provides an analytical framework for reaching such a conclusion in an 
individual dispute. It explains that a default preference for political 
resolution is reasonable in a realm of high constitutional stakes, a 
broad array of constitutionally acceptable, but suboptimal outcomes, 
no clear solutions, and unknown consequences. Yet it also identifies 
a role for courts and describes doctrinal approaches that courts can 
take on the margins to help ensure constructive political negotiation 
of executive privilege disputes. 
Part II describes existing executive privilege doctrine and 
scholarship and explores the need for a more theoretical 
understanding of the quality and relative advantages of judicial and 
political resolution of executive privilege disputes between the 
political branches. It observes the contrast this makes with the well-
theorized and much-debated approaches to abstention in other 
contexts. 
Part III evaluates political negotiation of executive privilege 
disputes. It identifies the constitutional values appropriate for 
assessing outcomes to executive privilege disputes: first, the extent to 
which an outcome supports the effectiveness of the government as a 
whole, and second, the degree to which an outcome supports the 
governmental structure provided by the Constitution. The section 
uses these values to build a descriptive model of the political 
resolution of executive privilege disputes. It rejects claims that 
political compromise generates constitutionally optimal outcomes to 
executive privilege disputes. It instead identifies a more realistic 
model for the political resolution of executive privilege disputes that 
focuses on constitutionally acceptable outcomes. This model in turn 
rests on three key assumptions that make the political resolution of 
executive privilege disputes between the political branches 
constitutionally acceptable in most cases: a range of constitutionally 
acceptable outcomes to executive privilege disputes exists, the 
political branches generally negotiate outcomes that fall within that 
range, and the procedure or substance of negotiations does not favor 
either of the political branches, so that, over time, negotiated 
outcomes favor neither branch. The section evaluates the 
reasonableness of these assumptions. It concludes that political 
negotiation generally, but not always, may be expected to generate 
constitutionally acceptable, if suboptimal, outcomes to executive 
privilege disputes. It recognizes the concerns about imperfect or 
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unacceptable outcomes generated by political resolution, but notes 
the advantage of the lack of precedential effect for these imperfect 
outcomes. 
Part IV turns to judicial involvement in executive privilege 
disputes between the political branches. It predicts that, were the 
combined effectiveness of the political branches and the division of 
power between them the only concern in an executive privilege 
dispute, courts routinely would intervene whenever they could 
identify a constitutionally preferable level of disclosure to that 
generated by political negotiation. It argues that the difference 
between this expectation and courts’ actual tendency to abstain from 
executive privilege disputes stems from two concerns about the 
legitimacy of judicial involvement: one caused by the awkward 
procedural postures of executive privilege disputes between the 
political branches, and another by the substance of disputes involving 
abstract questions of constitutional structure. As seen in the model 
this section provides, these legitimacy concerns do not bar judicial 
involvement in executive privilege disputes between the political 
branches, but they do give courts reason to act cautiously in the 
executive privilege context. Courts conceivably could minimize these 
legitimacy concerns by sitting as courts of constitutional equity or 
doctrinalizing rules governing the types of executive privilege 
disputes that they will entertain. This section argues that such 
substantial changes are unwise and unlikely. Courts nonetheless can 
change existing doctrine on the margins to encourage good faith 
negotiation and thereby improve the negotiation of executive 
privilege disputes between the political branches. Even with those 
changes, courts probably will continue to exercise an undoctrinalized 
prudential discretion to decide whether to abstain from executive 
privilege disputes between the political branches. Constitutionally 
suboptimal outcomes to those executive privilege disputes are likely 
to remain the norm. 
II. THE UNDERTHEORIZED RESOLUTION OF EXECUTIVE 
PRIVILEGE DISPUTES 
Commentators have endorsed political, rather than judicial, 
resolution of executive privilege disputes between the political 
branches. Yet both this and contrary views lack significant theoretical 
support in existing judicial doctrine and academic literature. This 
section first places the question how to resolve those executive 
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privilege disputes in the context of a brief history of executive 
privilege and a discussion of the many open questions and academic 
disputes regarding its specific substance and scope. Second, the 
section explores the undertheorized views on the quality and relative 
advantages of political and judicial resolution of executive privilege 
disputes between the political branches. It points out the greater 
development of views about judicial intervention and abstention in 
other contexts, such as when a federal court perceives companion 
litigation in a state court. 
A. Historical Assertions of Executive Privilege 
Presidents have asserted the power to withhold information since 
the tenure of President George Washington. In 1792, for example, 
the congressional inquiry into Major General St. Clair’s failed 
military expedition in Ohio led Washington to convene his cabinet 
and consider what information was appropriate to furnish to 
Congress.13 Washington decided to produce the information 
Congress sought but established that he stood ready to refuse to 
release any papers to Congress, “the disclosure of which would 
injure the public.”14 President Grover Cleveland successfully stood 
on this principle in 1886, when he refused to disclose information 
pertaining to removal of executive branch officials during his 
showdown with Congress over the Tenure of Office Act.15 
The asserted authority to withhold information from Congress 
received the name “executive privilege” in the Eisenhower 
administration, which invoked the privilege more than forty times, 
including during skirmishes with Congress over the Army-McCarthy 
hearings.16 Executive privilege disputes have been a consistent feature 
of the political landscape ever since. Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson did not invoke executive privilege as extensively as 
Eisenhower, but both accepted its validity as a constitutional 
principle.17 The Nixon administration famously ended in a 
 
 13. See FISHER, supra note 1, at 10–11. 
 14. Id. at 11. 
 15. See id. at 19–25. 
 16. See ROZELL, supra note 1, at 39. For an exhaustive discussion of the Eisenhower 
administration’s use of executive privilege, see Robert Kramer & Herman Marcuse, Executive 
Privilege—A Study of the Period 1953–1960, Part I, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623 (1961), Part 
II, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 827 (1961).  
 17. See ROZELL, supra note 1, at 41 (describing President Kennedy’s view of executive 
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showdown over the President’s assertion of an unreviewable 
executive privilege.18 The Ford and Carter administrations 
unsurprisingly took care to avoid similar conflagrations but 
nonetheless did not disclaim the privilege.19 Presidents Reagan, 
George H.W. Bush, and Clinton asserted executive privilege more 
aggressively.20 President George W. Bush’s invocation of executive 
privilege raised outcries of an imperial presidency,21 and left 
unresolved issues that spilled into President Obama’s 
administration.22 
The Supreme Court recognized executive privilege as a 
“constitutionally based” qualified privilege in United States v. Nixon, 
the decision that led to President Nixon’s resignation.23 It explained 
that courts can review assertions of executive privilege and should 
weigh them against other constitutional interests; in that case, the 
government’s interest in prosecution.24 The Court did not address 
congressional demands for information but it laid the groundwork 
for a similar balancing of the political branches’ constitutional 
interests in such a future dispute.25 
 
privilege as less expansive than Eisenhower’s, and describing Kennedy’s willingness to use the 
privilege to prevent oversight of foreign policy); id. at 42 (cataloging the Johnson 
administration’s refusals to provide information to Congress). 
 18. Id. at 54–71 (cataloging Nixon’s abuse of executive privilege). 
 19. See id. at 72–92. 
 20. The Reagan administration saw a number of high profile executive privilege 
disputes, and President George H.W. Bush defended his interest in limiting information 
disclosure even as he avoided the phrase “executive privilege.” See id. at 93–119. The Clinton 
administration was the end of the “era of presidential reluctance to use executive privilege . . . 
.” Id. at 122.  
 21. See, e.g., ROBERT M. PALLITO & WILLIAM G. WEAVER, PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY 
AND THE LAW 193–216 (2007); ROZELL, supra note 1, at 147–54; CHARLIE SAVAGE, 
TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 97 (2007); Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy 
and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489, 491–92, 541–42 
(2007); Doug Kmiec, The Use of Executive Privilege Must Be Reined In: Problematic Claims of 
Privilege Regarding the U.S. Attorney Firings and Torture Policies, FINDLAW, July 24, 2008, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20080714_kmiec.html.  
 22. See, e.g., Marisa Taylor & Margaret Talev, Obama Seeks Delay in Deciding on Rove 
Subpoena, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, Feb. 16, 2009, available at http://www.mcclatchydc. 
com/homepage/story/62290.html. 
 23. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974). 
 24. Id. at 711–13. 
 25. See, e.g., 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 77, 82–83 (1989) (citing Nixon and describing 
weighing of congressional and executive branch interests: “The more generalized the executive 
branch interest in withholding the disputed information, the more likely it is that this interest 
will yield to a specific, articulated need related to the effective performance by Congress of its 
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Subsequent courts have done little to quell the rancorous 
disputes between the political branches over the substance of 
executive privilege. The Supreme Court never has resolved an 
executive privilege dispute between the political branches on the 
merits. Questions left open by the courts include who can assert 
executive privilege, the extent to which a sitting President can 
override the executive privilege claim of a former President, the 
length of the period of secrecy justified by a President’s need for 
candid advice, and whether a President can compel the silence of 
subordinates by invoking executive privilege.26 
Many commentators accept the constitutional basis of a qualified 
executive privilege.27 In contrast, support for an unchecked and 
unqualified executive privilege does not appear in the academic 
literature.28 Shortly before Nixon, Raoul Berger espoused a strong 
 
legislative functions. Conversely, the more specific the need for confidentiality, and the less 
specific the articulated need of Congress for the information, the more likely it is that the 
Executive’s need for confidentiality will prevail.”). 
 26. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has 
provided some structure to the law in this area. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (distinguishing between (1) the deliberative process privilege, derived from common 
law, which protects predecisional, deliberative documents and that applies to executive officials 
generally; and (2) the presidential communications privilege, rooted in the separation of 
powers and the President’s unique constitutional role, which covers predecisional documents 
and other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations). That court’s 
continued willingness to make law in this area appears somewhat doubtful. See Comm. on the 
Judiciary, House of Representatives v. Miers, 542 F.3d 909, 910 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per 
curiam) (declining to hear and resolve appeal on an accelerated basis). 
 27. See, e.g., ROZELL, supra note 1, at 7–18 (cataloging arguments against the 
legitimacy of executive privilege); id. at 19–53 (concluding that “[w]hen exercised under the 
appropriate circumstances, executive privilege has clear constitutional, political, and historical 
underpinnings,” and enumerating arguments in favor of the legitimacy of executive privilege); 
Louis Fisher, Invoking Executive Privilege: Navigating Ticklish Political Waters, 8 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 583, 584 (2000) (acknowledging that it is “routine . . . to consider both [a 
congressional power of inquiry and the executive privilege] powers implied in the operation of 
the executive and legislative branches”). But see Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Critical 
Comment on the Constitutionality of Executive Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1143, 1152–70, 
1185–87 (1999) (discussing reasons to doubt existence of a valid executive privilege, but 
ultimately concluding that a narrow executive privilege, subject to the control of Congress, 
does exist). 
 28. See Mark Rozell, The Law: Executive Privilege Definition and Standards of 
Application, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 568, 568 (1999) (“On the fringes of the debate are 
those, such as scholar Raoul Berger, who have argued that executive privilege simply does not 
exist in our constitutional system, and those, such as former President Richard Nixon, who 
maintained that this power is absolute and not open to challenge by the coordinate branches of 
government.” (citing RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 
(1974); Letter from President Richard M. Nixon to Judge John Sirica, District Court Judge 
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view on the invalidity of any claim of executive privilege.29 Others 
have voiced similar concerns or expressed doubts.30 Proponents of 
statutory controls on executive privilege view its perceived 
constitutional basis as mistaken or subject to reasonable procedural 
rules and congressional interpretation.31 Commentators have 
disagreed even more when actual disputes force them to draw 
constitutional lines and define the scope and substance of executive 
privilege.32 In short, a healthy academic debate persists on the 
substance and scope of executive privilege. 
 
(July 25, 1973) (Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Alexandria, Va.)). 
 29. See generally BERGER, supra note 28.  
 30. See, e.g., PALLITO & WEAVER, supra note 21, at 213–14 (concluding that a 
“convincing case for a constitutionally based executive privilege has not yet been made,” but 
accepting executive privilege as “an established feature of our government of separate powers, 
in which each branch checks the others”); Kitrosser, supra note 21, at 493 (concluding that 
“there is no such thing as a constitutionally based executive privilege”). 
 31. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 21, at 493 (“[C]ourts should order compliance with 
any statutorily authorized demands for executive branch information.”); Emily Berman, 
Executive Privilege: A Legislative Remedy, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. 5 (2009) (discussing 
proposed statute and stating: “The statute’s chosen balance reflects a particular understanding 
of the relative weight of the interests at stake. While both Congress’s right to information and 
the President’s right to assert executive privilege are grounded in the Constitution, the burden 
placed on Congress by the withholding of necessary information is greater than the burden 
placed on the President by requiring disclosure. The Act’s standards regarding when the 
President’s zone of confidentiality must give way to congressional need recognize this 
distinction.”); Brian D. Smith, A Proposal to Codify Executive Privilege, 70 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 570, 600–12 (2002) (reviewing other codification proposals and arguing for a 
codification that creates a presumption of privilege). But see Neal Devins, Congressional-
Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal—Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 
109 (1996) (asserting that most members of Congress are happy with the current imperfect 
system); Rett D. Ludwikoski, Politicization and Judicialization of the U.S. Chief Executive’s 
Political and Criminal Responsibility, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 405 , 432–36 (2002) (arguing 
that the judiciary should not allow Congress to define the scope of executive privilege through 
legislation since that would politicize rule of law and destabilize government). This Article 
departs from Devins’ support of the status quo by proposing specific steps that courts can take 
to improve the outcomes of political negotiation. This Article also offers a new theoretical 
explanation of the relative values of political negotiation and judicial resolution of executive 
privilege disputes. 
 32. Compare Randall K. Miller, Congressional Inquests: Suffocating the Constitutional 
Prerogative of Executive Privilege, 81 MINN. L. REV. 631, 654–57 (1997) (arguing that 
congressional investigation of the executive has gone too far, resulting in the chilling of the 
ability to assert executive privilege), with Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern 
Presidents: In Nixon’s Shadow, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1069, 1122–24 (1999) (criticizing the 
Clinton administration’s “unprecedented” assertions of executive privilege). 
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B. The Undertheorized Process of Resolving Executive Privilege Disputes 
The process of resolving executive privilege disputes among the 
political branches has received less sustained analysis than the 
substance and scope of executive privilege. The Supreme Court has 
not explained when courts should entertain executive privilege 
disputes between the political branches and when they should leave 
them to the political process. Courts have appeared to avoid the 
merits of executive privilege disputes between the political 
branches.33 They have allowed, encouraged, and expressed a 
preference for political negotiation of executive privilege disputes 
between the political branches.34 Yet they have not provided a 
coherent or consistent theoretical justification for that preference, 
 
 33. See, e.g., ROZELL, supra note 1, at 164–65; Vikram David Amar, The Cheney 
Decision, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 184, 189–99 (2004) (describing Supreme Court’s 
decision in Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004), as an example of the Court 
declining to decide a case and criticizing the Court for failing to clarify executive privilege 
doctrine). 
Procedural doctrines developed by the courts also have limited the courts’ ability to 
resolve executive privilege disputes, thus leaving them to the political process. See, e.g., Walker 
v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2002) (concluding that the Comptroller General 
lacked standing to bring suit because he did not assert a personal injury); United States v. 
House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding that proper vehicle for 
pressing executive privilege arguments was a defense to a criminal prosecution, not a civil 
declaratory judgment action); see also Devins, supra note 31, at 130–32; O’Neil, supra note 12, 
at 1087–94; Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the Struggle for 
Control of Presidential Information, 90 GEO. L.J. 737, 752–53 (2002). 
 34. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T, Inc., 567 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“The 
framers, rather than attempting to define and allocate all governmental power in minute detail, 
relied, we believe, on the expectation that where conflicts in scope of authority arose between 
the coordinate branches, a spirit of dynamic compromise would promote resolution of the 
dispute in the manner most likely to result in efficient and effective functioning of our 
governmental system. Under this view, the coordinate branches do not exist in an exclusively 
adversary relationship to one another when a conflict in authority arises. Rather, each branch 
should take cognizance of an implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation 
through a realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the particular fact 
situation. This aspect of our constitutional scheme avoids the mischief of polarization of 
disputes.”); United States v. AT&T, Inc., 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“[A] better 
balance would result in the constitutional sense, however imperfect it might be, if it were 
struck by political struggle and compromise than by a judicial ruling.”); Comm. on the 
Judiciary, House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 56–57, 98 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(“Although standing ready to fulfill the essential judicial role to ‘say what the law is’ on specific 
assertions of executive privilege that may be presented, the Court strongly encourages the 
political branches to resume their discourse and negotiations in an effort to resolve their 
differences constructively, while recognizing each branch’s essential role. . . . The process 
contemplates a long period of negotiation with resort to the judiciary, if at all, only in the case 
of a legitimate impasse.”). 
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even though academic literature and judicial doctrine has provided 
theoretical justifications for judicial abstention in other contexts. 
Academic accounts have provided little theoretical support for a 
preference for either judicial or political resolution of executive 
privilege disputes between the political branches. A common view35 
that political negotiation best resolves executive privilege disputes 
draws upon Madison’s description of our constitution’s system of 
checks and balances that makes “[a]mbition . . . counteract 
ambition.”36 The structured opposition of the branches of 
government may render resort to the courts unnecessary in executive 
privilege disputes to the extent that the “several constituent parts [of 
the interior structure of government] may, by their mutual relations, 
be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.”37 
However, general support for checks and balances does not explain if 
and when courts have a role in executive privilege disputes between 
the political branches. It does not clarify, for example, why courts 
should have no role in an executive privilege dispute when their 
involvement could avert a constitutional crisis. 
Archibald Cox, the Watergate Special Prosecutor, argued that 
executive privilege disputes lend themselves “better to solutions 
negotiated through the political process than to an ‘either-or’ 
judicial determination.”38 In his view, courts should leave such 
disputes “to the ebb and flow of political power.”39 Mark Rozell has 
added his own rejection of judicial or legislative solutions to 
executive privilege disputes. He contends that each branch has 
sufficient political levers to protect its interests: “Through the 
normal political process of confrontation, compromise, and 
accommodation, the coordinate branches can usually satisfactorily 
resolve their differences over executive privilege. We cannot solve 
our modern dilemma by resort to the solution that was rejected by 
 
 35. See O’Neil, supra note 12, at 1083 (“The scholarship addressing information 
disputes between Congress and the President speaks with a remarkably unified voice on the 
critical issue of how such controversies are best resolved. Reduced to its essentials, that 
scholarship contends that in any given conflict over information, the Constitution’s structural 
distribution of powers will guide the political process to an optimal accommodation of the 
competing interests of each branch. External standards imposed by courts and judges, the 
literature assumes, will disrupt that organic process.”). 
 36. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
 37. Id. at 318–19. 
 38. Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1427 (1974). 
 39. Id. at 1432. 
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the Framers—that is, by demanding constitutional certitude.”40 Viet 
Dinh has criticized this view for leaving the door open to a vague 
judicial process as a complement to political resolution, but Dinh 
also has offered only the view that decisions about assertions of 
executive privilege are “best and properly made through a political 
process of give, take, and, ultimately, compromise between [the 
political] branches.”41 Other scholars have struck similar notes. 
Jonathan Entin has argued in favor of negotiation because frequent 
resort to litigation undermines valuable inter-branch comity.42 Louis 
Fisher has added that “what usually breaks the deadlock” in an 
executive privilege dispute is “a political decision” by one of the 
negotiating branches, not a court decision.43 Peter Shane has 
provided detailed suggestions for optimizing political negotiation, 
with the goal of structuring discussions to encourage sensible 
agreement.44 
Supporters of judicial resolution of executive privilege disputes 
also have not provided an analytical framework that can explain when 
 
 40. ROZELL, supra note 1, at 167. He also has commented that most executive privilege 
disputes can be resolved “through the normal ebb and flow of politics as envisioned by the 
Framers of our governing system.” Id. at 166; see also, Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege 
Revived? Secrecy and Conflict During the Bush Presidency, 52 DUKE L.J. 403, 421 (2002) 
(“The resolution to conflicts over executive privilege resides in the theory of separation of 
powers as envisioned by the framers of the Constitution. Congress and the courts possess the 
institutional powers needed to challenge presidential exercises of executive privilege.”). 
 41. Viet D. Dinh, Book Review, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 346, 347, 352–55 (1996) 
(reviewing MARK J. ROZELL, THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY (1994)). 
 42. Jonathan L. Entin, Executive Privilege and Interbranch Comity After Clinton, 8 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 664 (2000); see also Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the 
Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial Review, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 209 (1990). 
 43. FISHER, supra note 1, at xi; see also id. at xv, 259 (“Attempts to announce precise 
boundaries between the two branches, indicating when Congress can and cannot have 
information, are not realistic or even desirable.”). 
As Pallitto and Weaver state, see PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 21, at 193, the three 
major book-length studies of executive privilege are those by Fisher, see supra note 1, Rozell, 
see supra note 1, and Berger, see supra note 28. Berger and Rozell debate whether a 
constitutionally based executive privilege exists. Fisher, on the other hand, focuses on the tools 
and leverage used by the political branches during executive privilege disputes. He sees the 
constitutional “battles as largely a standoff,” and describes court decisions in the executive 
privilege area as “interesting but hardly dispositive.” FISHER, supra note 1, at xi; see also Louis 
Fisher, Congressional Access to Information: Using Legislative Will and Leverage, 52 DUKE L.J. 
323, 325–26 (2002) (explaining that political branches normally can resolve disputes and that 
courts have (and should have) a limited role). 
 44. Peter M. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge: Administrative Responses to 
Congressional Demands for Information, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 226–34 (1992). 
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and why judicial resolution of executive privilege reaches 
constitutionally preferable outcomes to those achieved by political 
negotiation. For example, Patricia Wald, former Chief Judge of the 
D.C. Circuit, and Jonathan Siegel defend the judicial role in 
executive privilege disputes, but they do not analyze the likely quality 
and relative advantages of political and judicial resolution of 
executive privilege disputes.45 
David O’Neil recently described a general preference for political 
resolution of executive privilege disputes between the political 
branches as having emerged “largely through inertia.”46 Yet, 
although he rebuts one possible theoretical justification for that 
preference,47 he does not provide an alternative theory in its place 
that describes the appropriate roles of each method for resolving 
executive privilege disputes. He does not explain what role courts 
should have in executive privilege disputes between the political 
branches and what principles should guide their discretion. He 
observes that “[c]ourts must provide a moderating influence, 
stabilizing the flow of information between the branches in a way 
that political safeguards alone cannot,” but does not elaborate on 
this proposal.48 
The existing academic literature and judicial doctrine thus has 
not sufficiently analyzed the relative quality of political and judicial 
resolution of executive disputes, or when or how a court should 
decide to entertain or abstain from an executive privilege dispute 
 
 45. See Wald & Siegel, supra note 33, at 766–67 (defending the judicialization of 
executive privilege disputes and asserting the special role and ability of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, although recognizing the role of political 
negotiation); see also Gia B. Lee, The President’s Secrets, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 253 
(2008) (rejecting notion that disclosure of information should be subject to political 
negotiation without discussing comparative advantages); Miller, supra note 32, at 633–34, 
654–55 (noting that “[o]bservers have concluded that political negotiation regarding access to 
information is effective and preferable to judicial adjudication,” and arguing that contemporary 
politics lacks the civility and ethic of cooperation necessary for negotiation to resolve executive 
privilege disputes, but providing limited comparison and evaluation of outcomes generated by 
political and judicial resolution of executive privilege disputes). 
 46. O’Neil, supra note 12, at 1082. 
 47. O’Neil explains that nothing in separation of powers doctrine supports a judicial 
refusal to adjudicate executive privilege disputes between the political branches. See id. at 
1102–17. He argues convincingly that neither Madisonian principles of checks and balances, 
concerns about judicial expertise or the destabilizing effect of judicial precedent, or original 
intent preclude a role for the courts in executive privilege disputes between the political 
branches. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1137.  
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brought to it by the political branches. This stands in notable 
contrast to the extensive judicial theorization and academic 
commentary in other contexts where courts must decide whether to 
entertain or abstain from a dispute. The doctrines of Younger,49 
Pullman,50 Burford,51 and Colorado River52 abstention each help 
define the relationship between state and federal courts. Younger 
alone has been cited over 9,000 times.53 The political question 
doctrine and its appropriate application, whether with respect to 
gerrymandering cases or Bush v. Gore, also has been much cited and 
debated.54 Whether courts should entertain or abstain from executive 
privilege disputes very conceivably could be doctrinalized or 
theorized in a similar fashion. Through its analysis of the quality of 
judicial and political resolution of executive privilege disputes, this 
Article provides a framework for answering that question. 
III. NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 
DISPUTES BETWEEN THE POLITICAL BRANCHES 
A comparative analysis of political and judicial resolution of 
executive privilege disputes between the political branches requires 
measures for evaluating the outcomes generated by each system. This 
section identifies two values for analyzing outcomes: the resulting 
overall effectiveness of government55 and the degree to which an 
outcome imperils or strengthens the Constitution’s systems of 
 
 49. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (directing abstention from suit for 
declaratory relief as to a state statute’s validity while being prosecuted under that statute in 
state court). 
 50. See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (allowing 
abstention in order to allow state courts to evaluate state laws challenged as unconstitutional). 
 51. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (permitting a federal court sitting 
in diversity jurisdiction to abstain where the state courts likely have greater expertise in a 
particularly complex area of state law). 
 52. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) 
(allowing prudential abstention where parallel litigation is occurring in state and federal 
courts). 
 53. Westlaw search performed on Aug. 16, 2009. 
 54. See generally THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2007). 
 55. The Article uses the term “overall effectiveness of government” to mean the sum of 
the degree to which an outcome ensures the effectiveness of each branch, weighted by the 
relative importance of the task facing each branch. Like the degree of fidelity to the system of 
constitutional structure, this metric allows simple discussion in the abstract, but obviously is 
hard to measure in any individual situation. 
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separated powers and checks and balances. This section then rejects 
claims that political negotiation will generate constitutionally optimal 
outcomes to executive privilege disputes. It offers a descriptive 
model of political negotiation of executive privilege disputes that 
recognizes an array of constitutionally acceptable, if suboptimal, 
outcomes. This section explains why political negotiation generally is 
likely to produce constitutionally acceptable outcomes to executive 
privilege disputes, an important fact given that many executive 
privilege disputes are resolved by negotiation and never presented to 
the courts. It argues that, because the political resolution of 
executive privilege disputes bestows limited precedential effect on 
the resulting outcomes, concerns about constitutionally suboptimal 
outcomes are reduced in the negotiation context. 
A. Constitutional Values and Executive Privilege Disputes 
An executive privilege dispute between the two political branches 
implicates two recognized constitutional powers: Congress’s power 
of oversight56 and the President’s power to withhold information.57 
The Supreme Court has justified executive privilege, and its 
protection of candid advice-giving, as necessary to the effective 
discharge of executive duties.58 The Court similarly has indicated that 
Congress’s power to investigate flows from its need to perform its 
legislative and oversight roles effectively.59 Conceived of in these 
terms, the resolution of a dispute over a congressional demand for 
information compromises the effectiveness of at least one of the 
political branches. But this mistakes the forest for the trees, as the 
Constitution ultimately is concerned with the combined effectiveness 
of the three branches of government.60 Accordingly, this Article 
 
 56. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (identifying Congress’s inherent 
power of inquiry). 
 57. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) (describing executive 
privilege as “constitutionally based”). 
 58. See, e.g., id. at 705 (“Human experience teaches that those who expect public 
dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for 
their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process.”); ROZELL, supra note 1, 
at 47–48. 
 59. See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) (“[T]he power of 
inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative 
function.”). 
 60. The Constitution’s Preamble speaks to this larger goal of an effective system of 
government that will provide for the needs of its citizens. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People 
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makes the utilitarian assumption that the quality of an outcome to an 
executive privilege dispute depends on the extent to which it 
advances the overall effectiveness of the government. The calculation 
of this value depends on the relative impact of an outcome on each 
branch’s effectiveness at performing its constitutional functions. That 
calculation also considers the relative importance of the task 
undertaken by the respective branches.61 For example, the balance 
“usually shifts decisively in Congress’s favor” in an impeachment 
proceeding.62 Similarly, the President arguably has strong claims to 
withhold information from Congress in the realm of foreign affairs.63 
The specific facts involved in a dispute between Congress and the 
executive branch control. There appear to be no rules hard-wired 
into the Constitution regarding what information Congress may 
demand or what the President may withhold.64 
 
of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic 
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution 
for the United States of America.”). The checks and balances established by the Constitution 
may compromise a single branch’s effectiveness in a given instance, but they help maintain the 
integrity and effectiveness of the constitutional system as a whole, making up “by opposite and 
rival interests” for “the defect of better motives.” THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320 (James 
Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987); see also id. at 319 (“But the great security against a 
gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department consists in giving to those 
who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to 
resist encroachments of the others.”). 
 61. To put these factors in a simple equation: Impact of an outcome on the overall 
effectiveness of government = (impact of the outcome on the effectiveness of the legislative 
branch x the importance of the legislative functions affected by the outcome) + (impact of the 
outcome on the effectiveness of the executive branch x the importance of the executive 
functions affected by the outcome). In a given instance, an outcome might have a negative 
impact on one branch’s important function and a limited impact on another branch’s less 
important function. The goal of dispute resolution should be to find the outcome that 
maximizes the value of the combined outcome. This example excludes the judicial branch only 
because this section discusses political negotiation. 
 62. ROZELL, supra note 1, at 27. 
 63. See id. at 4 (“[T]he presumption in favor of executive privilege has always been 
strongest in areas of national security and foreign policy.”); id. at 136 (characterizing as strong 
the claims of Attorney General Reno on this point and noting “the less controversial position[] 
that . . . the conduct of diplomatic relations requires that the president be able to communicate 
in secret with foreign leaders”); id. at 164 (“The Court made it clear” when protecting matters 
of national security or foreign relations that claims of executive privilege are “often difficult for 
another branch to overcome in a balancing of constitutional powers”). But see Louis Fisher, 
Congressional Access to National Security Information, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 219, 220 (2008) 
(arguing that Congress has no reason to defer to executive claims that Congress should not 
have access to national security information).  
 64. ROZELL, supra note 1, at 166–68 (rejecting search for constitutional absolutes or 
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The second key value for evaluating outcomes to executive 
privilege disputes between the political branches is the degree to 
which the outcome supports the structure of government provided 
by the Constitution. An exclusively utilitarian focus in executive 
privilege disputes might lead to ignoring constitutional limits on the 
balance of power among the branches.65 The Constitution has 
provided a very effective system of government, but the next century 
might see our government operate more effectively with either an 
executive branch that pays no heed to congressional demands for 
information or with a Congress that controls the executive branch 
through intense and invasive oversight. Abandoning our system of 
checks and balances in such a fashion would represent a departure 
from “the commitment to a belief that the Constitution means 
something and is binding.”66 Outcomes to executive privilege 
disputes between the political branches that preserve the 
governmental structure established by the Constitution thus 
obviously are constitutionally preferable to those that do not.67 
Similarly, an outcome that fits comfortably within that structural 
system would be constitutionally preferable to an outcome that 
strains or brushes up against the structural limits imposed by the 
Constitution. 
These two values permit analysis of tradeoffs in executive 
privilege disputes. The messy reality of an executive privilege dispute 
certainly makes precise evaluation impossible. Nonetheless, these two 
measures provide a basis for evaluating the best method for resolving 
an executive privilege dispute. 
 
certitude in executive privilege context).  
 65. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (“[T]he fact that a given law or 
procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing 
alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.”). Fisher has criticized Chadha’s 
rejection of “pragmatic agreements hammered out between the elected branches.” Louis 
Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 273 
(1993). Even if incorrectly applied in Chadha, however, it seems unobjectionable as a general 
matter that, however effective a device agreed upon by the political branches may be, its 
contravention of rules of constitutional structure renders it constitutionally invalid. 
 66. PALLITO & WEAVER, supra note 21, at 225. 
 67. The effectiveness of government raises questions of degree, i.e., whether an outcome 
to an executive privilege dispute produces a more or less effective government than an 
alternative outcome. The constitutional limitations on government structure, on the other 
hand, likely will generate the either/or question whether or not an outcome to an executive 
privilege dispute satisfies those principles. 
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B. The Unlikelihood of Constitutionally Optimal Outcomes 
Having identified these values, the question becomes how well 
political resolution can satisfy them in executive privilege disputes 
between the political branches. Judge Harold Leventhal, writing for 
the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. AT&T Co., 
counseled that, in the case of interbranch disputes, “each branch 
should take cognizance of an implicit constitutional mandate to seek 
optimal accommodation through a realistic evaluation of the needs 
of the conflicting branches in the particular fact situation.”68 O’Neil 
describes justifications for a preference for political resolution of 
executive privilege disputes (which he rejects) in a similar fashion: 
“[I]n any given conflict over information, the Constitution’s 
structural distribution of powers will guide the political process to an 
optimal accommodation of the competing interests of each 
branch.”69 These references may describe a relative optimum 
compared to available alternatives,70 but they nonetheless prompt 
questions whether political resolution can provide absolutely optimal 
outcomes to executive privilege disputes. 
The word “optimal” suggests a model of negotiation along a 
single dimension of the amount of information disclosure with one 
constitutionally optimal point: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68. United States v. AT&T Co., 567 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasis 
added). 
 69. O’Neil, supra note 12, at 1083 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1121–24 (rejecting 
notion that the political process necessarily will lead to constitutionally proper outcomes). 
 70. Judge Leventhal suggests as much by not repeating the word “optimal” elsewhere in 
his opinion. He discusses the negotiation process as constructive, for example, but does not 
suggest it is perfect. See AT&T, 567 F.2d at 130 (“The course of negotiations reflects 
something of greater moment than the mere degree to which ordinary parties are willing to 
compromise. Given our perception that it was a deliberate feature of the constitutional scheme 
to leave the allocation of powers unclear in certain situations, the resolution of conflict 
between the coordinate branches in these situations must be regarded as an opportunity for a 
constructive modus vivendi, which positively promotes the functioning of our system.”). 
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This model is plausible if the political branches share a collective 
constitutional insight that allows them to reach the constitutionally 
optimal outcome in all executive privilege disputes. Both Congress 
and the President have institutional resources for expert analysis of 
executive privilege disputes,71 but to date they do not appear to have 
combined these expert views into coherent collective constitutional 
decisions. Moreover, no matter how well such experts inform the 
branches, accounts of interbranch negotiations suggest that 
principles of constitutional interpretation do not guide the ultimate 
resolution of these disputes. One scholar has called them, “naked 
power struggles,”72 for example, and then-Assistant Attorney General 
Antonin Scalia has described the “hurly-burly, the give-and-take of 
the political process between the legislative and the executive.”73 
 
 71. See, e.g., Response to Congressional Requests for Information Regarding Decisions 
Made Under the Independent Counsel Act, 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 68 (1986); History of 
Refusals by Executive Branch to Provide Information Demanded by Congress, 6 Op. Off. 
Legal Counsel 751 (1982); see also Congressional Research Service, Presidential Claims of 
Executive Privilege: History, Law, Practice and Recent Developments 2–44 (Aug. 21, 2008).  
 72. O’Neil, supra note 12, at 1121. 
 73. FISHER, supra note 1, at 258 (quoting Executive Privilege—Secrecy in Government: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intergov. Rels. of the S. Comm. on Gov. Ops., 94th Cong. 87 
(1975) (statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel)). 
Total and immediate disclosure by President of information sought by Congress 
No disclosure by President of information sought by Congress 
Constitutionally optimal disclosure 
Excessive disclosure of information to Congress 
Insufficient disclosure of information to Congress 
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Dawn Johnsen has characterized the negotiation process as “messy” 
and as taking into account “institutional, partisan and personal 
interests.”74 It is hard to imagine how such a process in which the 
executive privilege question never is disaggregated from other 
political issues and the political branches only have blunt political 
tools at their disposal could lead to a purely reasoned outcome. No 
commentator has explained convincingly, for example, why each side 
getting out its constitutional cudgels—the President vetoing all bills, 
for example, and the Congress cutting off all funds or shutting down 
the nomination process—will lead to constitutionally optimal 
results.75 Nor would it necessarily even be preferable for the political 
branches to frame their disputes in terms of crucial issues of 
constitutional structure. Shane, for example, has described how the 
articulation of large constitutional principles in executive privilege 
disputes tends to harden lines of confrontation.76 This potential 
 
 74. Dawn Johnsen, Executive Privilege Since United States v. Nixon: Issues of Motivation 
and Accommodation, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1127, 1139 (1999). 
 75. See, e.g., Shane, supra note 44, at 198 (explaining that the adversarial nature of the 
negotiation process does not guarantee “that the optimal amount of information sharing will 
finally occur”). For example, nothing in the literature on executive privilege explains why one 
branch, at the height of political popularity, could not force the other branch, languishing in 
the depths of public opinion, to accept an outcome that shifts the balance of power among the 
branches. The use of all available constitutional weapons could exacerbate the problem in that 
situation as the unpopular branch might find itself even more damaged in the eyes of the 
electorate and thus weakened in the interbranch standoff if it uses the most serious 
constitutional weapons. 
 76. See id. at 220–21 (“Fueled by misunderstandings, however, about the other 
branch’s knowledge and intentions, the negotiators seem quickly to have shifted their rhetoric 
to general statements about presidential obligation and congressional prerogative. Once 
negotiators begin to act as though that level of principle is implicated in their disagreement, 
accommodation becomes vastly more difficult. In the words of former White House Counsel 
Fred Fielding: ‘If both parties are acting in good faith, you can negotiate a resolution to any 
issue unless or until it becomes an institutional clash. Once that occurs, resolution is very 
difficult because the issue has changed.’”). Thus, even though the political branches should 
take their institutional (rather than party) obligations seriously, see, e.g., FISHER, supra note 1, 
at 257 (“Whether lawmakers actually receive the requested information depends on their 
willingness, skills, and ability to devote the energy and time it takes to overcome bureaucratic 
hurdles. To do that job well, lawmakers have to think of themselves as belonging to an 
institution rather than to a composite of local interests.”), they should not necessarily frame 
the immediate practical concerns at hand as matters of high constitutional import if they wish 
for a speedy resolution. Any desire for the political branches to share in the obligation to 
perform constitutional analysis does not rebut these pragmatic views. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, 
Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707 (1985) (arguing 
that Congress has an independent duty to interpret the Constitution); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, 
The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 677–
84 (2005) (describing the executive branch’s capacity for constitutional interpretation and 
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hardening creates few incentives for the political branches to reason 
through the constitutional concerns present in an executive privilege 
question. A recent report lists a number of reasons to doubt why the 
“shifting balance of partisan forces” will allow the political branches 
to confront and resolve “the fundamental question whether 
Congress’s interest in disclosure outweighs the Executive’s interest in 
nondisclosure,”77 let alone do so in an optimal fashion. These 
include that political resolution can depend on the degree of press 
interest or scandal and can favor short-term political interests over 
long-term constitutional interests, that Congress always must 
overcome collective-action problems, and that the executive branch 
can extend an executive privilege dispute and make any information 
no longer timely.78 Each gives rise to significant concern. This is 
particularly true in a period of one-party government, when concerns 
are heightened that the separation of powers system has changed 
into a system of separation of parties.79 
Alternatively, the value of interbranch cooperation conceivably 
could justify whatever result Congress and the President reach. But 
this view would mean sacrificing government effectiveness and 
constitutional structure in favor of cooperation. It surely would not 
be constitutionally optimal for Congress to negotiate away its power 
to conduct oversight of the executive branch, or for the President to 
agree to provide Congress unlimited real-time access to all 
documents involving foreign relations decisions.80 Nor does the 
constitutionally optimal model find support in the fact that courts 
 
identifying possibilities for improvement). 
 77. Berman, supra note 31, at 16–23. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2324–25 (2006) (“[T]he bottom line remains that in the broad run of 
cases—which is, after all, the relevant perspective for constitutional law—party is likely to be 
the single best predictor of political agreement and disagreement. It is impossible to grasp how 
the American system of government works in practice without taking account of how partisan 
political competition has reshaped the constitutional structure of government in ways the 
Framers would find unrecognizable. Yet the constitutional law and theory of separation of 
powers has proceeded, for the most part, as if parties did not exist and the branches behaved in 
just the way Madison imagined.” (footnote omitted)). 
 80. The Supreme Court has held in other separation-of-powers contexts that the 
political parties’ agreement to such an unconstitutional distribution of powers does not cure 
the agreement’s flaws. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941–42 (1983) (“No policy 
underlying the political question doctrine suggests that Congress or the Executive, or both 
acting in concert and in compliance with Art. I, can decide the constitutionality of a statute; 
that is a decision for the courts.”); see also supra note 65. 
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might produce a worse outcome in a given executive privilege 
dispute. That would describe only the relative superiority of political 
resolution. It would not prove that the political branches can achieve 
the exactly correct outcome in the executive privilege disputes 
between them. 
C. The Likelihood of Constitutionally Acceptable Outcomes 
Scant, if any, grounds exist for the view that political negotiation 
will produce a constitutionally optimal outcome to an executive 
privilege dispute between the political branches. This suggests a 
more modest schematic for the political resolution of executive 
privilege disputes between the political branches. It focuses on 
constitutionally acceptable outcomes and their converse, 
constitutionally unacceptable outcomes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This model envisions the political branches resolving executive 
privilege disputes in ways that fall within a range of constitutionally 
acceptable outcomes, even if those negotiations do not reach the 
constitutionally optimal outcome. But it also recognizes that political 
negotiation can fail to meet constitutional standards. Rather than 
calling such outcomes unconstitutional, which implies judicial 
Total and immediate disclosure by President of information sought by Congress 
No disclosure by President of information sought by Congress 
Constitutionally optimal disclosure 
Constitutional ceiling 
Constitutional floor 
Unacceptable Outcomes 
Unacceptable Outcomes 
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review,81 this model identifies those outcomes as constitutionally 
unacceptable.82 A few broadly sketched hypotheticals demonstrate 
how the constitutional floor, ceiling, and optimum—measured on 
overall government effectiveness and fidelity to the intended 
constitutional structure—shift from one dispute to the next: 
Example One: Imagine that a journalist reveals that the President 
has kept a log detailing the sale of nominations for federal 
judgeships. Congress surely would initiate impeachment proceedings 
and seek disclosure of the log. Its interest in and claim to disclosure 
would be extremely high. An ensuing concession that the President 
could withhold the log would amount to an abdication of 
Congress’s impeachment power. In contrast, neither the need for 
effective government nor fidelity to constitutional structure support 
withholding of the information. Immediate full disclosure would 
seem the constitutionally optimal result, rendering any constitutional 
ceiling moot.83 
Example Two: Imagine a head of a congressional committee who 
uses the investigatory authority of the committee to harass the 
President for political reasons. Imagine further a President engaged 
in the process of secretly negotiating a delicate international security 
agreement. In those circumstances, limited or no disclosure in the 
short term, followed by full disclosure at a later date, should be 
constitutionally acceptable.84 It should ensure the effective 
functioning of both branches and should not cause any obvious shift 
in the balance of power between the political branches. The 
constitutional floor and ceiling likely would define a wide range of 
constitutionally acceptable outcomes. Total and immediate public 
 
 81. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing “judicial review” and the 
power of the Supreme Court to declare a statute “unconstitutional”). 
 82. Other writers have used this term. E.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING 
DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 202 (2001). This Article uses the term to avoid the 
implication that judicial review is necessary to establish the constitutional validity of a given 
outcome. 
 83. The exact timing and mechanics of disclosure (to whom to give the log and how 
much of the log to reveal immediately) might trigger some reasonable debate. The possibility 
of debate suggests the existence of a constitutional floor slightly beneath the constitutionally 
optimal point (i.e., there may be a constitutionally acceptable outcome that involves slightly 
slower disclosure than the optimal outcome). Such a floor would define a narrow range of 
constitutionally acceptable negotiated outcomes. 
 84. See, e.g., Shane, supra note 44, at 218–19 (outlining possible negotiated release of 
information in timed stages). 
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disclosure would seem to be an abdication of the President’s 
responsibility to advance national security interests.85 In contrast, 
Congress likely would abdicate its own responsibilities in foreign 
affairs and thus reduce the future effectiveness of government if it 
agreed never to know the contents of the negotiations.86 
Example Three: Imagine a committee inquiry, as part of the 
budgeting process, into the number of employees of certain pay 
grades within an administrative agency. Assuming that the 
information was not otherwise available, the President likely would 
have little or no justification for refusing to disclose this information 
to Congress. But the President also probably would offend no 
constitutional principle by offering (at least at first) information 
about another region or pay grade on the ground that it was more 
readily available than the information sought. Such an outcome 
might be constitutionally optimal if it maximizes the government’s 
effectiveness. In contrast, nondisclosure to Congress likely would fall 
below the constitutional floor. It would compromise effective 
government by rendering Congress unable to fulfill its constitutional 
responsibilities for appropriations, budgeting, and oversight.87 The 
constitutional ceiling likely would fall at a point where the request’s 
negative impact on the executive effectiveness substantially 
outweighs the value of the requested information. 
The model and hypotheticals demonstrate the difficulty of 
identifying an optimal outcome to an executive privilege dispute, 
even with perfect insight into congressional and presidential interests 
and motives. Even if all agree on the proper values for evaluating 
outcomes, the imperfect information in an actual executive dispute 
makes it hard to identify the optimal outcome and ranges of 
acceptable outcomes to that dispute. This raises doubts as to whether 
political negotiation routinely generates constitutionally acceptable 
outcomes to such disputes. Whether it meets that standard in turn 
rests on the assumptions that (1) a range of constitutionally 
acceptable outcomes to executive privilege disputes exists; (2) the 
 
 85. See, e.g., ROZELL, supra note 1, at 43–46 (articulating need for secrecy and 
arguments for availability of executive privilege in national security context). 
 86. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 1, at 230 (observing Congress’s “express constitutional 
powers and duties in the fields of military affairs and national security”). 
 87. See, e.g., ROZELL, supra note 1, at 124 (rejecting notion that Congress has a less 
valid claim to executive branch information when performing oversight than when performing 
its legislative function). 
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political branches generally negotiate outcomes that fall within that 
range; and (3) the procedure or substance of negotiations does not 
favor either of the political branches, so that, over time, negotiated 
outcomes favor neither branch. 
Each of these assumptions appears to be generally valid. The first 
flows from the principle that the Constitution allows some play in 
the joints of our system of government.88 The second has not been 
contradicted by one of the political branches having been forced to 
compromise, substantially or permanently, its performance of 
constitutional responsibilities.89 Fears about the increased priority of 
party rather than institutional affiliation90 appear somewhat allayed 
by views that persistent congressional committees generally have 
managed to gain the information they seek eventually.91 The third 
assumption appears to be supported by the historical record. 
Apparently, the prevailing view is that political negotiation leads to 
disclosure because of the large number of coercive tools at 
Congress’s disposal.92 As recent history has demonstrated, however, 
a determined administration willing to endure the resulting political 
backlash can withstand congressional inquiries at least long enough 
to avert significant disruption of the performance of its constitutional 
duties.93 Indeed, at least two recent Presidents have formally 
indicated a preference for negotiation.94 Moreover, existing academic 
 
 88. See Bain Peanut Co. of Tex. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931) (“The 
interpretation of constitutional principles must not be too literal. We must remember that the 
machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints.”). 
 89. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 1, at 258 (expressing need for Congress to assert its 
prerogatives but noting that “political battles between Congress and the executive branch are 
generally effective in resolving executive privilege disputes”). 
 90. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 79, at 2324–25 (discussing shift from “separation 
of powers” to “separation of parties”); see also Berman, supra note 31, at 8 (arguing that “[i]n 
the face of an Executive willing to stonewall, [Congress] is toothless”). 
 91. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
 92. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 21, at 258 (“Congress has the theoretical edge because 
of the abundant tools at its disposal. To convert theory to practical results requires from 
lawmakers an intense motivation, the staying power to cope with a long and frustrating battle, 
and an abiding commitment to honor their constitutional purpose.”). 
 93. As discussed above, the Bush administration refused to cooperate with congressional 
investigations into the firings of nine United States Attorneys in 2006. See Editorial, 
Investigating a Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, at A28. 
 94. Lloyd Cutler, Special Counsel to the President, Memorandum for All Executive 
Department and Agency Counsels re. Congressional Requests to Departments and Agencies for 
Documents Protected by Executive Privilege (Sept. 28, 1994), reprinted in Congressional 
Research Service, Congressional Oversight Manual App. C (May 1, 2007) (“In the last resort, 
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accounts and analyses do not demonstrate that negotiation itself 
causes permanent damage to the presidency or leads to results that 
do not comport with the balance of powers anticipated by the 
Constitution.95 
In sum, although grounds for concern exist, the assumptions 
beneath acceptance of political resolution of executive privilege 
disputes appear reasonable, indicating that political negotiation likely 
will generate constitutionally acceptable, if suboptimal, outcomes to 
executive privilege disputes. This conclusion does not mean that 
political negotiation will provide acceptable outcomes on all 
occasions or that a court could not produce a better outcome in any 
given dispute.96 However, it does permit a general acceptance of 
political negotiation as a constitutionally valid means for resolving 
executive privilege disputes. This is important given that many 
executive privilege disputes are never presented to the courts, but are 
resolved by political compromise. 
Constitutionally acceptable does not mean irreproachable, of 
course. History may disprove one of the assumptions identified 
above. As noted, serious concerns exist that political negotiation will 
generate imperfect or even unacceptable outcomes.97 Fortunately, 
the limited precedential nature of these outcomes lessens their 
impact; negotiated outcomes may establish norms for future 
 
this balancing [of the political branches’ interests] is usually conducted by the courts. 
However, when executive privilege is asserted against a congressional request for documents, 
the courts usually decline to intervene until after the other two branches have exhausted the 
possibility of working out a satisfactory accommodation. It is our policy to work out such an 
accommodation whenever we can . . . .”); Ronald Reagan, Memorandum for the Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies re. Procedures Governing Responses to Congressional 
Request for Information (Nov. 4, 1982), reprinted in Congressional Research Service, 
Congressional Oversight Manual App. B (May 1, 2007) (“Historically, good faith negotiations 
between Congress and the executive branch has minimized the need for invoking executive 
privilege, and this tradition of accommodation should continue as the primary means of 
resolving conflicts between the Branches.”). 
 95. This does not rule out the possibility that negotiation will lead to a constitutionally 
improper result that will become a “new normal.” See Restoring the Rule of Law: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 16 (2008) 
(statement of Harold Koh, Dean, Yale Law School) (arguing that major question following a 
period of constitutionally improper policies is whether the “pendulum . . . swing[s] back from 
where it has been pushed” or whether that extreme becomes the “new normal”). 
 96. See, e.g., Shane, supra note 44, at 224 (describing congressional complaints about 
executive branch information disclosure in the existing system that prefers negotiation). 
 97. See supra notes 72–79 and accompanying text (describing limitations of political 
resolution of executive privilege disputes). 
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disputes, but they lack the authoritative effect of legal judgments.98 
Relevant factors for political negotiation include elements unfamiliar 
to judicial decisions: party loyalties, the election cycle, the 
opportunity for politicians to make names for themselves, and the 
timeliness of the issue.99 With that provenance, negotiated outcomes 
do not merit the status of legal precedent. Rejecting the precedential 
effect of negotiated outcomes reflects the recognition that, whatever 
each branch’s capacity for constitutional interpretation may be, 
political negotiation is not interpretation and the outcome is not 
equivalent to a considered judicial judgment. Moreover, even if such 
negotiated outcomes did have precedential effect, the widely varying 
facts and political contexts of various executive privilege disputes 
would make them hard to draw upon in a new context. This limited 
precedential effect releases pressure from the system. By limiting the 
effect of any particular dispute, it allows the future correction of 
constitutionally imperfect (or potentially unacceptable) negotiated 
outcomes.100 
IV. JUDICIAL RESOLUTION OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE DISPUTES 
BETWEEN THE POLITICAL BRANCHES 
This section turns from political negotiation to evaluating 
judicial resolution of executive privilege disputes. The imperfection 
of politically negotiated outcomes would seem to leave a lot of room 
for judicial involvement (with the exception, of course, of disputes 
 
 98. Michael J. Gerhardt has recently defined “non-judicial precedents as any past 
constitutional judgments of non-judicial actors that courts or other public authorities imbue 
with normative authority.” Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
713, 715 (2008). He views nonjudicial precedent as “democratiz[ing] the implementation of 
the Constitution” by giving the public “some say over the implementation of constitutional 
values.” Id. at 780. Gerhardt’s analysis does not appear to speak to executive privilege disputes. 
As discussed above, notes 71–75, supra, nothing in the existing literature suggests that 
outcomes to executive privilege disputes represent collective, unified constitutional judgments 
of the political branches. Executive privilege disputes thus do not produce a considered 
judgment. The resulting compromise appears unlikely to represent the considered judgment of 
either branch. The absence of a collective constitutional conclusion would seem to deprive an 
outcome of precedential effect under Gerhardt’s definition. Moreover, executive privilege 
negotiations may occur outside the public eye, reducing the democratizing effect discussed by 
Gerhardt. 
 99. See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, Realism in Separation of Powers Thinking, 30 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 343, 347–53 (1989). 
 100. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 1, at 258 (describing risk of judicial establishment of 
“standards and doctrines that are too broad and awkwardly drawn”); ROZELL, supra note 1, at 
167. 
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that are resolved before either party tries to present the case to the 
courts). The foregoing discussion models executive privilege disputes 
as occurring along a single dimension, with the quality of outcomes 
measurable by their proximity to the optimal amount and timing of 
information disclosure. Under this unidimensional view, courts 
seemingly should resolve disputes any time they can identify an 
outcome that makes the political branches collectively more effective 
and that better supports the constitutional structure than the 
outcome offered by the political process. This section argues that 
courts take a more limited role because their involvement adds 
another dimension: concerns about judicial legitimacy stemming 
from the procedural posture of executive privilege disputes and the 
substance of those disputes. It employs a model to contend that, 
when considered along that additional dimension, outcomes to 
executive privilege disputes reached by courts will not routinely be 
preferable to those produced by negotiation. It notes that courts 
conceivably could escape these legitimacy concerns by relaxing 
procedural standards and sitting as courts of constitutional equity, or 
articulating clear rules as to the types of executive privilege disputes 
that they will entertain. The section explains that these steps are 
unwise and unlikely. Courts can make limited doctrinal changes on 
the margins to maximize the quality of political negotiation and thus 
improve the outcomes to executive privilege disputes between the 
political branches. However, courts are likely to continue to exercise 
an undoctrinalized prudential discretion to abstain from or resolve 
executive privilege disputes between the political branches.  
A. Judicial Legitimacy and Executive Privilege Disputes 
Executive privilege disputes pose at least two threats to the 
legitimacy of courts and their judgments. First, the awkward 
procedural postures of these disputes can undermine the legitimacy 
of the courts and their decisions. Second, the constitutional 
magnitude and political character of the disputes can raise questions 
about whether they are appropriate for judicial resolution. These 
legitimacy concerns add another dimension to executive privilege 
disputes and create challenges for courts as they face executive 
privilege disputes between the political branches. 
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1. Procedural exceptionalism  
Straining procedural doctrines to reach the merits of a case—
what might be called procedural exceptionalism—in executive 
privilege disputes threatens to delegitimize the courts and their 
judgments. As Alexander Hamilton explained, courts have power 
over neither the purse nor the sword, so they must rely on the 
strength of their judgments for their authority.101 The legitimacy of a 
judgment in American law depends in part on judicial fidelity to the 
adversary system and legal rules.102 This principle is expressed in the 
Article III requirement that courts only exercise jurisdiction over 
cases and controversies103 and the correlative prohibition on advisory 
opinions.104 Similarly, the standing doctrine ensures that courts only 
consider questions presented by parties with a meaningful interest in 
the outcome105 and the ripeness and mootness doctrines guarantee 
that courts only consider timely disputes.106 Straining any of these 
doctrines can represent a departure from the adversary principles 
underlying our legal system and delegitimize both the court and its 
decision. 
 
 101. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) 
(“The executive not only dispenses the honors but holds the sword of the community. The 
legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and 
rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over 
either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the 
society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE 
nor WILL but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm 
even for the efficacy of its judgments.”). 
 102. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (“[With respect to the 
need to provide evidence to prosecutors, w]e have elected to employ an adversary system of 
criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to 
develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive.”). 
 103. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 104. Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113–14 
(1948) (“This Court early and wisely determined that it would not give advisory opinions even 
when asked by the Chief Executive. It has also been the firm and unvarying practice of 
Constitutional Courts to render no judgments not binding and conclusive on the parties and 
none that are subject to later review or alteration by administrative action.”). 
 105. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 (1992) (explaining that, to satisfy 
the constitutional minimum of the standing doctrine, a litigant must show injury, causation, 
and redressability); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (“In essence the 
question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of 
the dispute or of particular issues.”). 
 106. See Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807–08 
(2002) (describing the ripeness doctrine); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 
43, 68 n.22 (1997) (describing the mootness doctrine). 
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As discussed above, Nixon remains a central executive privilege 
decision because of its recognition of a constitutionally based 
executive privilege. Yet commentators have criticized it 
extensively,107 including on the ground that the Court stretched 
procedural doctrines in order to reach the merits of the case.108 Like 
other separation of powers cases, it posed important constitutional 
questions and arose in the context of a dramatic constitutional 
showdown between the political branches, creating incentives to 
resolve the merits of the dispute. But it also raised serious questions 
about the entitlement of the parties to assert the constitutional 
interests at stake since it pitted a member of the executive branch 
against the President.109 The Supreme Court never has ruled on an 
executive privilege dispute directly between the two most 
appropriate parties to any law-making in this area, the President and 
Congress. The only cases that have reached the Court have involved 
assertions of institutional claims by proxy, raising questions about 
the ability of the parties to press institutional interests.110 It even is 
unclear whether a direct conflict, hypothetically styled Congress v. 
President, would vindicate the long-term institutional interests rather 
than those of the individual office holders.111 There thus exists 
 
 107. Akhil Reed Amar has described Nixon as a dishonest precedent that only can be 
explained by the assumption that the Supreme Court already had smoking gun evidence of 
President Nixon’s criminality. Akhil Reed Amar, Nixon’s Shadow, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1405, 
1420 (1999) (describing Nixon as a “crooked precedent[]” impeding both dishonest and 
honest presidents). Paul J. Mishkin has blamed the negotiated character of the opinion for its 
weaknesses and criticized the political branches for forcing the courts to address the question. 
Paul J. Mishkin, Great Cases and Soft Law: A Comment on United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA 
L. REV. 76, 87–88, 91 (1974). 
 108. E.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Caesarism, Departmentalism, and Professor Paulsen, 83 
MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1424 (1999) (arguing that the Nixon dispute was nonjusticiable because 
it was purely an intrabranch dispute); William Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional 
Review of United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REV. 116 (1974). 
 109. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 697 (1974) (“[T]he fact that both parties 
are officers of the Executive Branch cannot be viewed as a barrier to justiciability.”). 
 110. For example, Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004), and the related 
Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2002), involved Vice President Cheney 
asserting the executive branch’s interests and, on the other side, good government groups and, 
at least at the beginning of the litigation, the Government Accountability Office—the 
investigative arm of Congress—asserting the disclosure interest. Moreover, it may be 
appropriate for each political branch to consider the other branch’s interests, thus undoing the 
adversary posture of the case. See United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 
1977). 
 111. An expansive view of presidential power does not necessarily advance the interests of 
the presidency. For example, as former head of the Office of Legal Counsel, Jack Goldsmith, 
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serious cause for concern that executive privilege disputes directly 
between the branches will ever have the procedural postures that 
confer legitimacy on decisions reached by Article III courts. The fact 
that executive privilege disputes so rarely reach the courts likely 
exacerbates such concern. 
2. Substantive concerns 
In addition to these procedural concerns, executive privilege 
disputes between the political branches may raise concerns about the 
capacity of courts to provide satisfactory outcomes given the 
substance of these disputes. Judicial involvement may impose 
negative effects upon our constitutional system to the extent that 
frequent resort to litigation harms interbranch comity.112 More 
generally, it may be unwise to “draw the judiciary into 
intragovernmental controversies in their raw, politically-tinged state” 
where “the judicial touch is likely to be unsure.”113 This concern may 
be overstated to the extent that the Supreme Court routinely 
resolves the most politically controversial legal issues arising in the 
United States.114 At the very least, it suggests that disputes among 
the branches will generate enormous scrutiny that will magnify any 
flaws in the resulting outcome and potentially strain the decision-
 
explains, an administration can accomplish more of its objectives when it cooperates with 
Congress rather than taking unyielding positions on presidential power. See JACK GOLDSMITH, 
THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 177–
215 (2007). Similarly, the interest of the presidency in an executive privilege dispute may be 
total withholding of information in some cases, but in others it may tend toward effective 
performance of its office, even if that means yielding some information. Whatever the 
presidency’s interest in candid advice, other interests exist, such as the ability for the 
administration to continue to press its agenda and to prevent wrongdoing within the executive 
branch. In waiving executive privilege “voluntarily,” for example, President Nixon asserted that 
he did so to protect the institutional interests of the presidency. See ROZELL, supra note 1, at 
66. It is hard to believe that the institutional interests of the presidency were identical to the 
individual interests of President Nixon. See generally O’Neil, supra note 12, at 1121–29 
(noting the unlikelihood that institutional interests will align with the interests of the occupant 
of that institution). 
 112. See Entin, supra note 42, at 664. A destruction of comity would reduce the 
attractiveness of any judicial resolution to an executive privilege dispute, even if the courts 
resolved the case with perfect adherence to constitutional precedent and principle. 
 113. Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term—Foreword: On Presidential 
Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 38–39 (1974). 
 114. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942–43 (“[T]he presence of constitutional issues 
with significant political overtones does not automatically invoke the political question 
doctrine.”). 
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making process.115 
Others have argued that executive privilege disputes constitute 
political questions that are entirely inappropriate for judicial review. 
In 1975, for example, then-Assistant Attorney General Scalia argued 
before a Senate Subcommittee that attempting to weigh the 
presidential interest in withholding information against Congress’s 
need for disclosure is “the very type of political question from  
which . . . the courts [should] abstain.”116 However, Scalia’s view 
appears to depend more on the perceived inappropriateness of 
bringing a President into court than on factors articulated by the 
Supreme Court (and particularly the classic restriction on deciding 
issues over which a coordinate branch has discretion).117 A separate 
but related concern is reflected in an analogous context in then-
Justice Rehnquist’s separate opinion in Goldwater v. Carter.118 
Rehnquist states concerns regarding whether courts should rule on 
abstract questions of constitutional structure (although these 
concerns find no obvious root in the factors listed in Baker v. 
 
 115. See Mishkin, supra note 107, at 87–88 (arguing that courts do not necessarily 
perform at their best in high-profile cases where their legitimacy may be called into question 
because they strain to reach unanimous outcomes). 
 116. See Executive Privilege—Secrecy in Government, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Intergov. Rels. of the S. Comm. on Gov. Ops., 94th Cong. 83 (1975). 
 117. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (“Prominent on the surface of any case 
held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without 
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility 
of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.”). 
 118. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“In 
light of the absence of any constitutional provision governing the termination of a treaty, and 
the fact that different termination procedures may be appropriate for different treaties, the 
instant case, in my view, also ‘must surely be controlled by political standards.’” (internal 
citations omitted)). Focusing on the absence of a textual grant of discretion, Rehnquist’s view 
reverses the classical strand of the political question doctrine, which bars consideration of issues 
over which another branch has discretion pursuant to a specific textual grant. See Baker, 369 
U.S. at 217; see also Rachel E. Barkow, The Rise and Fall of the Political Question Doctrine, in 
THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
supra note 54, at 36 (describing prominence of this factor, the “‘classical’ formulation of the 
doctrine,” in political question cases after Baker v. Carr, and its root in Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (“Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the 
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.”)). 
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Carr,119 the seminal modern political question case). His view may 
reflect the awkward procedural postures of disputes between the 
executive and legislative branches, concern about placing the 
judiciary above the political branches and the possibility that the 
political branches might retaliate or ignore a court decision,120 or a 
preference for not rendering constitutional law fixed.121 Whatever the 
exact nature of this concern, it adds to substantive concerns about 
judicial involvement in executive privilege disputes, even if the 
existing political question doctrine or other rules governing the 
substance of disputes courts may entertain do not require courts to 
abstain from these disputes. 
3. Implications of legitimacy concerns 
These procedural and substantive concerns suggest that the 
threats to courts’ legitimacy associated with judicial involvement in 
an executive privilege dispute between the political branches 
introduce additional constitutional risks. Conversely, inappropriate 
abstention may pose comparable dangers. The courts could 
conceivably permit a constitutional crisis to occur if they refused to 
resolve an executive privilege dispute. If “[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is,”122 circumstances surely can be imagined in which the failure to 
adjudicate a dispute would constitute a constitutionally unacceptable 
 
 119. Baker, 369 U.S. 186. 
 120. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: 
JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 16–35 (2007) 
(depicting political retaliation against the Supreme Court in the founding period). 
 121. See, e.g., MICHAEL FOLEY, THE SILENCE OF CONSTITUTIONS 76–77 (1989); see also 
ROZELL, supra note 1, at 167 (discussing Foley’s views). 
 122. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177 (emphasis added). There are, of course, weighty arguments 
that the political branches have a coequal responsibility to interpret the Constitution. Each 
branch must consider its own constitutional duties and act accordingly. See, e.g., FISHER, supra 
note 1, at 259 (“Lawmakers, assigned specific constitutional duties over the military and 
national security, have no reason to defer to presidential claims of exclusive or overriding 
power.”); Gerhardt, supra note 98, at 718 (contending that “judicial supremacy is not a fact of 
our constitutional life” given the expansive stretches of law that the courts do not determine); 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 
83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221 (1994) (arguing that each branch of government has a coequal power 
to interpret the Constitution). This section does not argue that courts alone have such a 
responsibility. It advances the more modest point that there likely are occasions on which the 
courts have a duty to resolve cases to validate their role in the constitutional system and to 
avoid constitutional crises. 
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result (independent of the merits of the underlying dispute). 
Declining a case in the face of corruption or an extreme abuse of 
power might undermine the rule of law.123 For example, an executive 
privilege dispute could ensue were Congress to demand documents 
that would form the basis of impeachment if released. By refusing to 
exercise jurisdiction, courts would disclaim the authority to remedy a 
failure of the political process to produce a constitutionally 
unacceptable outcome. 
The constitutional risks associated with overassertive judicial 
intervention in, or inappropriate judicial abstention from, executive 
privilege disputes between the political branches suggest another 
dimension to the model for resolving these disputes. Depicted as a 
horizontal axis, it has as its poles inappropriate judicial abstention 
and overly assertive judicial involvement. When combined with the 
existing model, a zone of constitutionally acceptable results falls 
within a ring of constitutionally unacceptable outcomes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 123. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the President After Twenty-five 
Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1400–01 (1999). Michael Stokes Paulsen has argued that, in 
Nixon, the Court inappropriately displaced Congress as the body with the primary 
responsibility for checking an out-of-control President because it cut short impeachment 
proceedings and weakened the impeachment power. This raises fundamental questions about 
the proper role of the courts in our system of constitutional government. For example, it poses 
the question whether courts may strain their judicial role when they have clear evidence of 
criminal wrongdoing. This Article does not answer such questions. Instead, it assumes that 
some circumstances (even if limited) exist in which the abstention of the courts represents a 
constitutionally unacceptable outcome. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 
370 (2004) (describing Nixon as a situation in which “a court’s ability to fulfill its 
constitutional responsibility to resolve cases and controversies within its jurisdiction hinged on 
the availability of certain indispensable information”). 
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The additional dimension is not the only difference between the 
political and judicial models for resolving executive privilege 
disputes. Negotiation offers as many possible outcomes as the 
negotiators can imagine.124 The judicial process, on the other hand, 
can offer as few as three outcomes: those offered by the two parties, 
and abstention. Courts may be able to fashion other remedies, but 
they lack the flexibility offered by negotiation.125 Courts might send 
the political branches away for more negotiation, for example, but at 
some point that delay becomes judicial abstention, leaving courts 
with the three original optional outcomes. As sketched in the 
following pair of examples, these outcomes may not present 
attractive alternatives for a court. 
Example One: Imagine a congressional committee that has run 
roughshod over the administration in a political witch-hunt that 
 
 124. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 31, at 125–26 (describing a number of different ways 
that Congress and the President can compromise). See generally FISHER, supra note 1 
(detailing compromises struck by political branches throughout nation’s history). 
 125. See, e.g., Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for Contempt of 
Congress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 626 (1991) (“The creative compromises that can be 
achieved through the political process are better tailored to resolving a specific dispute than the 
‘either-or’ solutions generated by judicial resolution.”). 
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began as a search for employees sympathetic to a foreign sovereign. 
The committee seeks preliminary advice given to the President by a 
subset of those employees. Imagine that the President has invoked 
executive privilege and Congress has brought a civil action that 
satisfies, at least as much as possible, justiciability requirements. 
Under those assumptions, the court might have the options 
illustrated in the following figure: 
 
 
 
Refusal to resolve the dispute (point A-1) likely would result in a 
constitutionally unacceptable outcome if the politically powerful 
Congress subsequently won disclosure through the political process. 
Such a result would measure poorly with respect to both 
constitutional values discussed in Part III: it would result in the 
impairment of the effectiveness of the government as a whole and 
the courts would have disclaimed their potential role as a protector 
of the constitutional structure. Resolving the case in favor of the 
President (point A-2) by allowing the administration to withhold 
certain contested documents which have no particular relevance to a 
legitimate congressional inquiry likely provides a constitutionally 
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acceptable outcome. Finally, resolving the case in favor of the 
committee (point A-3) likely would make government less effective 
by making the presidency susceptible to virtually unlimited and 
unfocused inquiry and harassment by Congress. Given these options, 
the court should entertain the case and resolve the dispute at point 
A-2. The resolution may not be optimal, but (under the present 
assumptions) it is not constitutionally unacceptable and produces a 
better outcome than the available alternatives. 
Example Two: Imagine an administration that declines to provide 
Congress with routine operational information, resulting in a lawsuit. 
Assume also that the case comes to the courts in a procedural 
posture that does not provide a clear basis for jurisdiction; for 
instance, a group of minority party members have brought the suit. 
The court might be able to force the administration to turn that 
information over to Congress, but it would have to strain procedural 
doctrines to do so. Under those assumptions, the court’s options 
might look as follows: 
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Abstaining in this case (B-1) would be appropriate under existing 
procedural rules and thus likely would not put the court’s legitimacy 
at issue. However, abstention could result in a major defeat of 
Congress and the creation of an unacceptable example of the 
President stymieing routine oversight. A ruling on the merits in the 
administration’s favor would result in damage to both the court and 
Congress (B-2). Resolving the case in favor of Congress (B-3) would 
result in an optimal result from the standpoint of disclosure but 
damage the court in the form of legitimacy lost by overreaching. No 
option, in other words, would provide a constitutionally acceptable 
result, leaving the court to pick among evils.126 
 
 126. Because each outcome is unsatisfactory, constitutionally unacceptable outcomes 
become relative here. This might suggest that the denomination “constitutionally 
unacceptable” becomes redundant, since the courts only must focus on picking the least 
imperfect result. It remains relevant, however, as a mechanism for evaluating whether the 
political branches have inflicted harm on the constitutional order by failing to negotiate a 
constitutionally unacceptable outcome. The political branches likely could have averted such a 
Hobson’s choice through good faith, reasonable negotiation, and the wise use of political 
levers. The cost of a resulting constitutionally unacceptable outcome lies at their feet. See, e.g., 
FISHER, supra note 1, at 259 (arguing that courts and Congress should not retreat in the face 
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These examples sketch the tradeoffs facing courts in executive 
privilege disputes. While this schematic has limitations, it provides 
two insights. First, the introduction of courts into executive privilege 
disputes raises the constitutional stakes by putting that branch’s 
legitimacy at issue. Second, the introduction of courts does not 
prevent an executive privilege dispute from ending with the type of 
suboptimal result seen in political negotiation. Courts may generate 
a better answer than the political branches to the question of the 
appropriate amount of information disclosure, but broader 
constitutional considerations may make outcomes provided by 
judicial resolution constitutionally infirm. Courts generally face a 
tough choice. They can leave the political process to generate an 
imperfect, but acceptable, outcome that does not have precedential 
effect. Or they can resolve a case, possibly improving the outcome 
with respect to the information disclosure ordered, but setting a 
possibly imperfect precedent for future disputes and unleashing 
unknown collateral constitutional costs. An exceptional case, such as 
one involving clear presidential wrongdoing, might make that 
equation simpler, but these disputes generally pose murky and 
difficult questions. With such profound constitutional issues put at 
stake by their involvement, courts often are reasonable to abstain and 
leave these disputes to the political process. 
B. The Possible (but Unlikely) Expansion of the Judicial Role 
The preceding discussion described how procedural 
exceptionalism and substantive concerns in executive privilege 
disputes threaten the legitimacy of courts that resolve these disputes. 
Courts purportedly address these problems by strictly adhering to 
established procedural doctrines. However, these efforts at 
procedural integrity seem prone to failure at important moments or 
to appearing like ways of avoiding the merits or indirectly reaching a 
sought-after result.127 A changed approach at least merits 
consideration. 
 
of assertions of executive privilege). Describing the quality of outcomes in a purely relative 
manner downplays that responsibility. 
 127. See, e.g., supra notes 107–08 (discussing criticisms of Nixon despite its explicit 
treatment of procedural arguments); Amar, supra note 33, at 192–207 (criticizing Cheney 
decision for failing to resolve ambiguities in executive privilege doctrine). 
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1. Courts of constitutional equity 
One conceivable alternative to the status quo would be for courts 
to relax procedural doctrines substantially. That step might limit the 
precedential effect of the resulting judgment, but our system might 
benefit from such a tradeoff. Courts could acknowledge the 
enduring procedural complexities—for example, that suits among 
the political branches raise questions about the ability of litigants to 
press the long-term institutional interests at stake—but nonetheless 
resolve the disputes. In other words, courts could conceivably sit as 
courts of constitutional equity.128 Sitting in constitutional equity 
would free the courts from strict substantive or procedural rules and 
doctrine and allow them to generate equitable, largely non-
precedential outcomes. In keeping with equitable practice, courts 
could require submission of the most information possible to the 
court before crafting injunctive relief designed to maximize the 
constitutional interests at stake.129 
This would be a drastic reversal of the courts’ historic approach. 
Courts have never claimed this expansive, equitable role. They 
appear to have purposefully avoided such a role by limiting the scope 
of their executive privilege decisions and their ability to demand the 
information necessary to make an equitable judgment.130 Perhaps 
 
 128. This option arguably has a textual basis in the Constitution. The judicial power of 
the United States “extends to all Cases, in law and equity.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. If 
the Constitution grants courts the authority to say what the “law” is in separation of powers 
disputes, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803), it conceivably could 
empower courts to identify where the constitutional equities lie in a dispute between the 
branches. 
 129. See generally 1 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 467–69 (3d ed. 
1922) (describing freedom allowed to a court sitting in equity). 
 130. For example, in the dispute over the disclosure of the names of the energy task force 
led by Vice President Cheney (concededly not one directly between the President and 
Congress), the Supreme Court limited discovery through an extraordinary writ of mandamus, 
concluding that the executive need not assert executive privilege before a court can consider 
separation of powers arguments. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 390–91. Even 
when courts arguably have tested the limits of the judicial process, see Wald & Siegel, supra 
note 33, at 745–47 (defending judicialization of executive privilege disputes and describing 
AT&T cases, which saw repeated efforts by the courts to encourage negotiation, as highly 
unusual cases that tested the limits of the judicial process by stressing negotiation over the 
adversary, party-driven approach common to our system), they have encouraged negotiation 
without demanding full disclosure of the contested information to the court for review. See 
United States v. AT&T, Inc., 551 F.2d 384, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also Comm. on 
Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 56–57, 98 (D.D.C. 
2008). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009 7:19 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1168 
John Marshall could have claimed this power had the occasion 
arisen, but at this point, such a power of constitutional equity lies 
down a fork in the road that our constitutional history has left long 
behind. Asserting such a power now and loosening or casting aside 
the extensively doctrinalized procedural prerequisites to suit, such as 
standing, ripeness, and mootness,131 would be an enormous claim by 
the judicial branch. It is hard to imagine such a move given the likely 
attacks on an “activist” judicial branch. This potential means for 
avoiding accusations of procedural exceptionalism thus would appear 
to be a non-starter. 
2. Doctrinalization of judicial discretion to entertain executive 
privilege disputes 
Courts could avoid, or at least reduce, concerns about their 
ability to entertain certain substantive categories of disputes by 
articulating clear rules regarding the categories of executive privilege 
disputes they will entertain. As noted previously, the existing political 
question doctrine does not clearly mandate judicial abstention from 
executive privilege disputes. However, the calculus a court likely 
would engage in to determine whether to entertain an executive 
privilege dispute suggests the possibility of a prudential version of 
the political question doctrine.132 Such a prudential approach might 
serve as a “general tool of avoidance,” allowing courts to maintain 
their legitimacy rather than engaging in what might be perceived as 
activist judicial review in politically charged circumstances.133 
Alexander Bickel described prudential abstention as one of the 
passive virtues of courts in the face of judicial anxiety and doubt that 
courts will reach the right outcomes.134 
 
 131. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text. 
 132. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 118, at 28–33 (discussing prudential considerations in 
the historical application of political question doctrine). 
 133. Id. at 33. 
 134. BICKEL, supra note 81, at 184 (describing as foundation of political question 
doctrine: “(a) the strangeness of the issue and its intractability to principled resolution; (b) the 
sheer momentousness of it, which tends to unbalance judicial judgment; (c) the anxiety, not so 
much that the judicial judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it should but will not be;  
(d) finally (‘in a mature democracy’), the inner vulnerability, the self-doubt of an institution 
which is electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength from.”); see also Mark 
Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability, in THE POLITICAL QUESTION 
DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 54, at 47, 69–74 
(discussing Bickel). 
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A prudential doctrine, largely unattached to constitutional text, 
lacks a clear limiting principle.135 The doctrinalization of the political 
question doctrine in Baker v. Carr arguably did away with or 
significantly curtailed the sort of free-flowing prudential calculations 
imagined by Bickel.136 Courts could undertake a similar 
doctrinalization in the executive privilege field.137 They could carve 
out specific types of executive privilege cases they would consider 
and limit the subject matters that remain nonjusticiable regardless of 
the procedural posture. For example, courts could require a 
threshold showing that failure to resolve the case would impinge on 
a core constitutional function of one of the branches. The creation of 
such rules could insulate courts from criticism that they entertain the 
substance of executive privilege disputes between the political 
branches erratically or without guiding principle. 
Doctrinalization appears unwise and unlikely, however. Courts 
have indicated no willingness to doctrinalize the categories of 
executive privilege disputes they will entertain. Nor should courts 
attempt to impose such limitations. One apparent lesson from Baker 
v. Carr and its progeny is that prudential limitations that courts 
impose upon themselves have little force when push comes to 
shove.138 Courts likely will discredit themselves if similar self-imposed 
prudential principles in the executive privilege context fall by the 
wayside when a high profile dispute tests judicial commitment to 
those constraints. 
Executive privilege disputes between the political branches thus 
may represent an enduring enclave of non-doctrinalized prudential 
judicial decisions as to justiciability. Successful judicial pressure on 
the political branches to negotiate outcomes to executive privilege 
disputes likely will allow it to remain that way.139 The fewer executive 
 
 135. See Barkow, supra note 118, at 33. 
 136. Tushnet, supra note 134, at 73. 
 137. See, e.g., supra notes 49–54, and accompanying text (describing doctrinalization of 
abstention rules in other contexts). 
 138. See 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Barkow, supra note 118, at 36 (indicating that prudential 
strands of political question doctrine—i.e., those not pertaining to the textually demonstrable 
grant of discretionary authority to a coordinate branch of government—have had little or no 
effect since being articulated in Baker). 
 139. See Devins, supra note 31, at 131–32 (“For better or worse, the courts are extremely 
hesitant to play a leading role in defining executive-legislative relations. On such issues as war 
powers, the veto power, the incompatibility clause, and recess appointments, the courts have 
used justiciability and other devices to sidestep resolution of executive-legislative disputes. In 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009 7:19 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1170 
privilege cases that require adjudication, the less courts will need to 
articulate standards for deciding which executive privilege cases to 
entertain. If history is a guide, courts likely will continue to make 
discretionary calculations, through muddy constitutional waters, as 
to when it is best for them to entertain or abstain from executive 
privilege disputes between the political branches. 
C. Remaining Opportunities for the Judiciary 
Courts can play a legitimate role in executive privilege disputes 
between the political branches even if they do not make dramatic 
changes in their treatment of these disputes. As an initial matter, 
courts can still stand ready to resolve executive privilege disputes 
between the political branches as a last resort, even if they are 
unlikely to expand their role in these disputes dramatically. 
Negotiation could fail in a number of ways: a political branch could 
refuse to negotiate in good faith or have no incentive to negotiate;140 
one branch might not be able to use the political weapons at its 
disposal because of the greater political popularity of the other 
branch, or because the political cost to itself of using one of its 
political weapons might outweigh any political benefit;141 one branch 
might overvalue or undervalue its constitutional interest or that of 
the other political branch;142 or the political branches might 
negotiate a fair, but unconstitutional, redistribution of their powers 
(for example through an agreement for Congress to exercise 
legislative veto authority in exchange for a renunciation of certain 
oversight powers). Each of these possible scenarios suggests the 
 
this way, the Court maximizes utility among the branches and, thus, minimizes the chance of 
retaliation against its own interests. Specifically, by ducking the substantive issues raised in 
these disputes, the courts have found a graceful way of avoiding substantive decisions against 
one or the other elected branch.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
 140. The Nixon-era controversy over disclosure of the Oval Office tapes likely fell in this 
category. Nixon’s political survival apparently depended on absolute withholding of the tapes 
sought in Nixon, so he had no incentive to negotiate in good faith. President Nixon resigned 
effective August 9, 1974, after the Supreme Court issued its decision on July 24. 
 141. Under this view, an administration likely can get away with conduct that is not 
sufficiently harmful to justify the heavy steps available to the other branch. One might wonder, 
for example, whether an administration might recognize its ability to defy Congress when the 
Congress does not have sufficient political support to refuse to process all presidential 
nominees or to cut off funding to a specific executive department. 
 142. Criticism describing the Bush administration, and particularly Vice President 
Cheney, as overly dedicated to the concept of executive power suggests that negotiation with 
that administration would fail for this reason. See, e.g., SAVAGE, supra note 21, at 330. 
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benefit of judicial involvement in executive privilege disputes 
between the political branches. They represent a breakdown of the 
incentive and valuation systems necessary for successful negotiation. 
Courts may be able to avert a constitutionally unacceptable outcome 
by hearing such cases, a likelihood that particularly argues for their 
continued involvement in executive privilege disputes. 
Furthermore, courts can improve the outcomes to executive 
privilege disputes between the political branches without actually 
resolving them on the merits.143 As noted above, it appears likely that 
courts will continue to abstain from resolving the merits of many 
executive privilege disputes between the political branches. However, 
courts still may be able to encourage good faith negotiation in three 
different ways. 
First, courts should avoid erecting unnecessary procedural 
hurdles. This step could prevent executive privilege disputes between 
the political branches from expiring at the courthouse door. 
Procedural hurdles render it easier for the executive branch to use 
delay and procedural maneuverings to succeed in keeping 
information secret and permit congressional bullying to endure 
unnecessarily.144 In whatever way courts weigh the competing 
constitutional interests, it seems unwise to establish a thicket of 
procedural rules or opportunities for delay in executive privilege 
cases. These procedural rules may impede a court from addressing an 
important dispute in the future or, if the court sidesteps those rules 
to address the merits, delegitimize a subsequent decision. To avert 
procedural delay and gamesmanship and to encourage good faith 
 
 143. Gia Lee recently has argued for a change in the way that courts resolve executive 
privilege disputes. She contends that courts should evaluate the claims made by both branches. 
She particularly argues that courts should evaluate the quality of individual claims that the 
disclosure of executive branch communications would reduce the President’s ability to receive 
candid advice. Lee, supra note 45, at 260. Evaluating the veracity of executive claims for the 
need for candor could provide welcome specificity and legitimize a resulting court decision by 
grounding it in the facts. However, that calculus also raises concerns about judicial 
involvement in the intimate details of the executive branch and questioning that branch’s 
assessment of its own needs. Such a searching inquiry gives cause for hesitation as does Lee’s 
rejection of political negotiation. See id. at 253. As discussed above, both political and judicial 
resolution of executive privilege disputes are likely to deliver constitutionally suboptimal 
outcomes, but political negotiation generally provides a lower-stakes method for resolving such 
disputes. 
 144. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 390–91 (2004) (allowing the 
executive branch to press separation of powers arguments before an official assertion of 
executive privilege is made). See generally FISHER, supra note 1, at 258 (describing 
administration’s efforts to defeat negotiation even when promising to cooperate). 
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negotiation, courts should make clear that they can and will entertain 
executive privilege disputes.145 Retaining discretion to abstain from 
or entertain executive privilege disputes provides a mechanism for 
courts to manage the inflow of executive privilege disputes that will 
not bind courts more tightly than they might hope in subsequent 
disputes. 
Second, to the extent possible, courts should consider the 
approach taken to the negotiations by each political branch. The 
failure of one branch to negotiate in good faith should inform a 
court’s decision whether to entertain the merits of an executive 
privilege dispute. Courts should not allow either a Congress resolute 
to get to court, or a President resolute to stay out of court, to 
achieve its goal merely by refusing to negotiate or by going through 
the motions. Instead, courts should take advantage of opportunities 
to verify the quality of negotiations and manage the case accordingly. 
Concern about the commitment to resolving a dispute could appear 
in a number of contexts. For example, Justice Ginsburg noted in her 
dissenting opinion in Cheney the irony of the government’s request, 
on behalf of executive branch officials, for a writ of mandamus to 
limit discovery when it had made no motion in the district court to 
narrow discovery.146 A branch’s behavior in negotiations may give 
rise to similar inferences about the seriousness of its commitment to 
resolving the dispute amicably. 
Third, courts should limit the scope of any ruling on executive 
privilege questions in recognition of the complicated procedural 
postures and infrequent adjudication of such disputes. Clear rules 
might facilitate the negotiation of executive privilege disputes but 
clear, imperfect rules could make negotiation no longer likely to 
produce results within the range of the branch’s settled expectations. 
 
 145. Neal Devins has argued for the status quo, contending that courts should not 
expand their role in executive privilege disputes. See Devins, supra note 31, at 111. He takes a 
position consistent with that taken here, maintaining that “greater judicial involvement risks 
more harm than good,” and uses this insight to argue against reforming existing approaches. 
Id. at 110. Since Devins’ writing, however, the Cheney energy task force and Miers subpoena 
cases suggest that, under that status quo which prefers negotiation, courts may run the risk of 
allowing their procedures to ensure slow, procedural deaths for executive privilege disputes. 
See, e.g., Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives v. Miers, 542 F.3d 909, 910–11 
(D.C. Cir. 2008); Adam Clymer, Agency Ends Pursuit of Cheney Energy Panel Data, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2003, at A18. Opportunities for reform thus may exist in developing judicial 
doctrine to encourage good faith negotiation, even without an expansion in the cases that 
courts resolve on the merits. 
 146. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 403–04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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Limiting rulings as much as possible to the facts of the case might 
encourage the political branches not to approach each dispute as an 
opportunity to win more constitutional territory. Lowering the 
stakes of executive privilege disputes between the political branches 
could facilitate more reasonable negotiation.147 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Executive privilege disputes between Congress and the President 
pit two sets of constitutional interests against each other, raising 
important questions of constitutional structure. These high stakes 
would seem to demand clear rules for deciding when courts or the 
political process should resolve these disputes. The existing process 
for resolving executive privilege disputes, which mixes political 
negotiation with infrequent and halting judicial involvement, 
disappoints any such expectations. Political negotiation is likely to 
produce constitutionally acceptable, but suboptimal, outcomes when 
measured on the dimensions of overall government effectiveness and 
support for the structure of government prescribed by the 
Constitution. Courts can disaggregate the information disclosure 
question from other existing political issues and thus may provide a 
better answer to the specific information disclosure question posed 
by an executive privilege dispute. However, judicial involvement 
raises other constitutional concerns, making it likely that judicial 
resolution of executive privilege disputes also will be constitutionally 
suboptimal. The likely imperfections of both judicial and political 
resolutions to executive privilege disputes present a choice between 
imperfect, non-precedential politically negotiated outcomes and 
possibly better, precedential judicial resolutions that may trigger 
constitutional imbalances. A default preference for political 
negotiation of most executive privilege disputes is supported by 
reasonable assumptions about the quality of the outcomes generated 
by political negotiation and legitimacy concerns regarding judicial 
resolution of such disputes. Courts can make limited doctrinal 
changes to encourage constructive negotiation. That said, they likely 
will and should continue to abstain from resolving the merits of 
many of the executive privilege disputes presented to them, even 
 
 147. See Shane, supra note 44, at 220–21 (describing difficulty in reaching a negotiated 
result once the political branches conceive of the dispute through the lens of constitutional 
principle and the rhetoric of each branch’s prerogatives). 
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though this may ensure the suboptimal resolution of those disputes. 
 
 
